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Abstract
In multinomial choice settings, Daly-Zachary (1978) and Armstrong-Vickers (2015) provided closed-
form conditions, under which choice probability functions can be rationalized via random utility models.
A key condition is Slutsky symmetry. We first show that in the multinomial context, Daly-Zachary’s
Slutsky symmetry is equivalent to absence of income-effects. Next, for general multinomial choice that
allows for income-effects, we provide global shape restrictions on choice probability functions, which
are shown to be sufficient for rationalizability. Finally, we outline nonparametric identification of prefer-
ence distributions using these results. The theory of linear partial differential equations plays a key role
in our analysis.
Keywords: Multinomial Choice, UnobservedHeterogeneity, randomUtility, Rationalizability/Integrability,
Slutsky-Symmetry, Income Effects, Partial Differential Equations, Nonparametric Identification.
JEL Codes: C14, C25, D11.
1 Introduction
The random utility model of multinomial choice (McFadden, 1973) has gained immense popularity among
applied economists. However, there has been limited research on the micro-theoretic underpinning of such
models, and in particular, on the question of which choice probability functions are logically consistent
with a random utility model.1 Daly and Zachary 1978 provided a set of closed-form, global conditions
under which choice-probability functions can be justified as having arisen from preference maximization
by a heterogeneous population. These conditions were re-stated in Anderson et al, 1992, Theorem 3.1, and
independently derived in Armstrong and Vickers, 2015, who improved upon the Daly-Zachary results by
1There has been comparatively more work on rationalizability in empirical demand models with continuous goods, c.f. Lewbel,
2001 and Hausman and Newey, 2016.
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including an outside option in the choice set. In all of these results, a key condition for rationalizability is
Slutsky symmetry, analogous to the classic textbook case for demand systems with continuous goods.
In this paper, we first show that in the multinomial setting, Daly-Zachary’s Slutsky symmetry is equiva-
lent to the absence of income effects, i.e. that conditional choice probabilities do not depend on the decision-
makers’ income. The “necessity” part is easy to show. Showing “sufficiency”, i.e. that Slutsky symmetry
implies absence of income effects is non-trivial, and represents the first result of the paper. Next, in multino-
mial settings that allow for income effects, we provide a set of alternative shape restrictions on conditional
choice probability functions, including a counterpart of Slutsky symmetry, which together are shown to be
sufficient for rationalizability. The proof of this result is constructive, and the rationalizing utility functions
are obtained by inverting solutions of certain partial differential equations (PDEs). The way in which PDEs
arise here is unrelated to Roy’s Identity (c.f. Mas-Colell et al, 1995, Proposition 3.G.4); in particular, the
partial derivatives appearing in the PDE are of the average demand function, not the indirect utility function.
Finally, we show that the rationalizability results can also be used to nonparametrically identify the
underlying preference distributions from empirical choice-probabilities. A key restriction delivering this
identification result – viz. invertibility of sub-utilities in the numeraire due to non-satiation – is based on
economic theory, as opposed to statistical assumptions. Furthermore, achieving nonparametric identification
by solving PDEs appears to be novel in the discrete choice literature.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses Daly-Zachary’s Slutsky symmetry
condition, and its connection with lack of income effects. Section 3 discusses rationalizability for multi-
nomial choice in presence of income effects, and presents Theorem 1, the key result of this paper. Section
4 discusses some further points, including the implication of the rationalizability result for nonparametric
identification of preference distributions. A short appendix at the end presents two mathematical results on
partial and ordinary differential equations that are intensively used in the paper.
2 The Daly-Zachary Result
Consider a setting of multinomial choice, where the discrete alternatives are indexed by j = 0,1, ...,J, indi-
vidual income is y, price of alternative j is p j; if alternative 0 refers to the outside option, i.e. not buying
any of the alternatives, then p0 ≡ 0. Let the utility from consuming the jth alternative and a quantity z
of the numeraire be given by U ( j,z). The consumer’s problem is max j∈{0,1,...,J},z [U ( j,z)+ ε j], subject to
the budget constraint z ≤ y− p j, where y is the consumer’s income, p j is the price of alternative j faced
by the consumer, and ε j is unobserved heterogeneity in the consumer’s preferences. If U ( j, ·) is strictly
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increasing (i.e. non-satiation in the numeraire), then we can replace z = y− p j , and rewrite the consumer
problem as max j∈{0,1,...,J} [U ( j,a j)+ ε j], where a j ≡ y− p j. Denote the (structural) probability of choosing
alternative j ∈ {0, ...,J} at a≡(a0, ..,aJ) by q j (a). In words, if we randomly sample individuals from the
population, and offer the vector a to each sampled individual, then a fraction q j (a) will choose alternative j,
in expectation. It is easy to incorporate other attributes of the alternatives and characteristics of consumers
in our analysis, and we outline how to that below, after Theorem 1. For now, we suppress other covariates
for clarity of exposition.
Slutsky-Symmetry: In this set-up, Daly-Zachary’s Slutsky symmetry conditions are that for any two
alternatives k, l ∈ {0,1, ...,J}, k 6= l,
∂
∂al
qk (a) =
∂
∂ak
ql (a) .
2 (1)
We first show that the classic random utility model with no income effects implies (1). We then show the
first result of our paper, viz. that Slutsky symmetry (1) implies absence of income effects.
Necessity: The canonical random utility model of multinomial choice assumes that utility from con-
suming the jth alternative at income y and price p j is given by
U ( j,a j) = a j, (2)
where a j = y− p j as above. Income effects are zero since demand depends on the a’s via the differences
a j−ak =(y− p j)−(y− pk)= pk− p j. Suppose (ε0,ε1, ...εJ) are continuously distributed with joint density
g(·). Then, the choice probability for the 0th alternative is given by
q0 (a)
= Pr
(
∩ j 6=0
{
a0+ ε0 > a j+ ε j
})
= Pr
(
∩ j 6=0
{
a0−a j > ε j− ε0
})
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ a0−a1+ε0
−∞
...
∫ a0−aJ+ε0
−∞
g(ε)dεJ...dε1dε0.
2Daly-Zachary defines choice probabilities as functions of price and income, q˜ j (p0, p1, ..., pJ,y). This is equivalent to our
notation of q j (a0,a1, ...aJ) with a0 = y, a1 = y− p1,...,aJ = y− pJ , in that one can move back and forth between the two notations,
since
q j (a0,a1, ...,aJ) = q˜ j (a0−a1,a0−a2, ...,a0−aJ) , and
q˜ j (p1, p2, ..., pJ,y) = q j (y,y− p1,y− p2, ...,y− pJ) .
“Slutsky symmetry” in Daly-Zachary’s notation is that ∂ q˜k/∂ p j = ∂ q˜ j/∂ pk for all j 6= k (if alternative 0 is the ouside option, then
the corresponding condition is ∂ q˜0/∂ p j = ∂ q˜ j/∂y). which is identical to (1) in our notation.
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Therefore, by the first fundamental theorem of calculus,
∂
∂a1
q0 (a)
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ε0+a0−a2
−∞
...
∫ ε0+a0−aJ
−∞
g(ε0,a0−a1+ ε0,ε2, ...εJ)dεJ...dε2dε0. (3)
Similarly,
q1 (a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ε1+a1−a0
−∞
...
∫ ε1+a1−aJ
−∞
g(ε)dεJ...dε2dε0dε1,
implying
∂
∂a0
q1 (a)
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ a1−a2+ε1
−∞
...
∫ a1−aJ+ε1
−∞
g((a1−a0+ ε1,ε1,ε2, ...ε J| ,γ)dεJ...dε2dε1 (4)
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ s0+a0−a2
−∞
...
∫ s0+a0−aJ
−∞
g(s0,s0−a1+a0,ε2, ...εJ)dεJ...dε2ds0
=
∂
∂a1
q0 (a) , using (3),
where the second equality follows by substituting s0 = a1−a0+ ε1 in (4).
The same argument can be repeated for any other pair of alternatives l 6= k, to obtain
∂
∂ak
ql (a)
∂
∂al
qk (a)
= 1, (5)
for all a. This shows that in the canonical random utility model with no income effects, Daly-Zachary’s
Slutsky symmetry condition holds.
Sufficiency: We now show that Slutsky symmetry implies absence of income effects. To see this, first
note that because ∑Jk=0 qk (a) = 1, differentiating both sides w.r.t. al gives
∂
∂al
ql (a)+
J
∑
k=0,k 6=l
∂
∂al
qk (a) = 0. (6)
Substituting (1) in (6), we get:
∂
∂al
ql (a)+
J
∑
k=0,k 6=l
∂
∂ak
ql (a) = 0. (7)
This is a linear, homogeneous partial differential equation in ql (·), and can be solved via the method of
characteristics (c.f. Courant, 1962, Chapter I.5 and II.2). The characteristic curve, i.e. the J-dimensional
subspace on which ql (a) remains constant, can be obtained as follows. Parametrize a j = a j (r), j= 0,1, ...J
and consider
0=
dql
dr
=
∂ql (a)
∂al
dal (r)
dr
+
J
∑
k=0,k 6=l
∂ql (a)
∂ak
×
dak (r)
dr
.
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Comparing with (7), we get
dak (r)
dr
= 1, k = 0,1, ...J,
implying the so-called “characteristic” Ordinary Differential Equations:
dak
dal
= 1, k = 0, ...l−1, l+1, ...,J, (8)
with generic solutions ak−al = ck, k = 0, ...l−1, l+1, ...,J. This means that general solutions to (7) are of
the form
ql (a) = H
l (a0−al,a1−al, ...,al−1−al,al+1−al, ....aJ −al) , (9)
where H l (·) is any arbitrary continuously differentiable function. Thus ql (a) depends on the (J+1)-
dimensional argument (a0,a1,a2, ...aJ) through a J-dimensional vector
(a1−al,a2−al, ...,al−1−al,al+1−al, ....aJ −al) .
That (9) is a solution to (7) can also be verified directly by partially differentiating the RHS of (9), and
verifying that it satisfies (7). Finally, note that
(a0−al,a1−al, ...,al−1−al,al+1−al, ....aJ−al)
= (pl , pl− p1, ..., pl − pl−1, pl− pl+1, ....pl − pJ) ,
and so (9) implies that ql (a) does not depend on income. Since l is arbitrary, we have shown that Slutsky
symmetry implies that income effects are absent.
3 Rationalizability under Income-Effects
The previous section raises the question of whether utility maximization in a setting of multinomial choice
that allows for (individually heterogeneous) income effects impose any restriction on choice-probabilities.
In other words, is there a counterpart of Slutsky symmetry under income effects? In this section, we state that
counterpart, and show that this analog, plus a set of shape-restrictions on choice-probabilities are together
sufficient for rationalizability.
Counterpart of Slutsky Symmetry: Let there be J+1 exclusive and indivisible alternatives, indexed by
j = 0,1, ....,J. A consumer can choose one among these J+1 alternatives, plus a quantity z of a continuous
numeraire that they can buy after paying for the indivisible good, subject to the budget constraint z≤ y− p j,
where y is the consumer’s income, and p j is the price of alternative j faced by the consumer. We assume
preferences are non-satiated in the numeraire, and denote the amount of numeraire consumed upon having
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bought alternative j by a j = y− p j, with a0 = y corresponding to choosing the outside option 0. Denote
the (structural) probability of choosing alternative j ∈ {0, ...,J} at a≡(a0, ..,aJ) by q j (a). In words, if we
randomly sample individuals from the population, and offer the vector a to each sampled individual, then a
fraction q j (a) will choose alternative j, in expectation. Then our counterpart of Slutsky symmetry is:
(A): For any a, and any pair of alternatives k 6= l, the ratio ∂∂ak ql (a)/
∂
∂al
qk (a) depends only on
ak and al .
Motivation: To see where this restriction comes from, consider the above setting of multinomial choice,
and let the utility from consuming the jth alternative and a quantity z of the numeraire be given byU ( j,z)+
ε j. The
{
ε j
}
, which represent unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, are allowed to have any arbitrary
and unspecified joint distribution in the population (subject to the resulting choice probability functions
being smooth). If U ( j, ·) is strictly increasing (i.e. non-satiation in the numeraire), then we can replace
z= y− p j ≡ a j, and rewrite the consumer problem as
max
j∈{0,1,...,J}
[U ( j,a j)+ ε j] . (10)
To allow for income effects, we let U ( j,a j) ≡ h j (a j), where h j (·) are smooth, possibly nonlinear, strictly
increasing, unspecified functions of the a j’s. When h j (·) are nonlinear, the conditional choice-probabilities
will depend on income, i.e., there are non-zero income effects. This structure is also observationally equiv-
alent to a utility structure where unobserved heterogeneity is not additively separable from the a j’s (see
below) in the utility function.
Now, for the above set-up, the choice probability for the 0th alternative is given by
q0 (a)
= Pr
(
∩ j 6=0
{
h0 (a0)+ ε0 > h j (a j)+ ε j
})
= Pr
[
∩ j 6=0
{
h0 (a0)−h j (a j)> ε j− ε0
}]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ (h0(a0)−h1(a1))+ε0
−∞
...
∫ (h0(a0)−hJ(aJ))+ε0
−∞
g(ε)dεJ...dε1dε0. (11)
Therefore, by the first fundamental theorem of calculus,
∂
∂a1
q0 (a)
= −h′1 (a1)


∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ε0+h0(a0)−h2(a2)
−∞ ...
∫ ε0+h0(a0)−hJ(aJ)
−∞ g


ε0,
(h0 (a0)−h1 (a1))+ ε0,
ε2, ...εJ


dεJ...dε2dε0

 . (12)
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Similarly,
q1 (a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ε1+h1(a1)
−h0(a0)
−∞
...
∫ ε1+h1(a1)
−hJ(aJ)
−∞
g(ε)dεJ...dε2dε0dε1,
implying by the first fundamental theorem and chain-rule that
∂
∂a0
q1 (a)
= −h′0 (a0)
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ h1(a1)
−h2(a2)+ε1
−∞
...
∫ h1(a1)
−hJ(aJ)+ε1
−∞
g

 h1 (a1)−h0 (a0)+ ε1,
ε1,ε2, ...εJ

dεJ...dε2dε1 (13)
(1)
= −h′0 (a0)
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ s0+h0(a0)−h2(a2)
−∞ ...
∫ s0+h0(a0)−hJ(aJ)
−∞ g


s0,
s0−h1 (a1)+h0 (a0) ,
ε2, ...εJ


dεJ...dε2ds0
=
h′0 (a0)
h′1 (a1)
∂
∂a1
q0 (a) , using (12),
where the second equality
(1)
= follows by substituting s0 = h1 (a1)−h0 (a0)+ ε1 in (13).
The same argument can be repeated for any other pair of alternatives l 6= k, to obtain
∂
∂ak
ql (a)
∂
∂al
qk (a)
=
h′k (ak)
h′l (al)
, (14)
for all a, and it is clear that the RHS of (14) depends only on ak and al , and thus satisfies condition (A) above.
As an aside, note that for the RHS of (14) to be identically equal to 1 (the Daly-Zachary condition), we must
have that hl (al) = β 0+ β 1al for some β 0,β 1. To see this, first note that when evaluated at ak = al = c,
condition (14) yields
h′k(c)
h′l(c)
= 1 for all c, implying hk (c) = hl (c)+ k for all c. Using this, we have that
1=
h′k (ak)
h′l (al)
=
h′l (ak)
h′l (al)
⇒ h
′′
l (a) = 0,
implying hl (al) = β 0+β 1al , and thus the choice-probabilities cannot display income-effects.
Remark 1 Condition (14) has no relation with the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property.
Indeed, the model above will not have the IIA property if the ε js are correlated across alternatives (i.e.
across j), but it will continue to satisfy (14), since uncorrelatedness of εs was not used to derive (14).
Main Result: We are now ready to state and prove our main result. The result is that the counterpart
of Slutsky symmetry stated above, plus two shape-restrictions on q j (·)’s are jointly sufficient for rationaliz-
ability, i.e., under those restrictions on q j (·)’s, we can find a set of utility functions and a joint distribution
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of unobserved preference heterogeneity, such that individual maximization of these utilities will indeed
produce the conditional choice-probabilities
{
q j (·)
}
, j = 0,1, ...,J.
To state and prove this result, we will use the following additional notation: let a− j denote the vector
(a0,a1, ...a j−1,a j+1, ...aJ) and let lima− j↓−∞ denote that each component of a− j goes to −∞.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the following three conditions are satisfied by the choice-probabilities
{
q j (a)
}
:
(i) For each j = 0,1, ...,J, and each a, q j (a) is strictly increasing in a j and strictly decreasing in ak for
k 6= j, continuously differentiable in each argument, and for all j, lima− j↓−∞ q j (a) = 1 and lima j↓−∞ q j (a) =
0= 1− lima j↑∞ q j (a);
(ii) There exists an alternative m such that for any other alternatives j 6= m and any a satisfying
∂
∂a j
qm (a) 6= 0, the ratio
∂
∂am
q j (a)/
∂
∂a j
qm (a) does not depend on ak, for k /∈ {m, j}, and has uniformly
bounded derivatives with respect to am and a j;
(iii) for each r = 0,1, ...J, the Jth order cross partial derivatives ∂
J
∂a0∂a1...∂ar−1∂ar+1...∂aJ
qr (a) exist, are
continuous, and satisfy (−1)J ∂
J
∂a0∂a1...∂ar−1∂ar+1...∂aJ
qr (a)≥ 0.
Then there exist random variables V = (V0,V1, ...,Vm−1,Vm+1, ...,VJ) with support V ⊑ R
J, and func-
tions w j (a,v j) : R×V j →R, such that w j (·,v j) are strictly increasing and continuous, wm (am,vm)≡ am,
and
q j (a0,a1, ...,aJ) =
∫
V
∩k 6= j1
{
w j (a,v j)≥ wk (ak,vk)
}
f (v)dv
here f (·) denotes the joint density function of V on V . Thus the utility functions
{
w j (a,v j)
}
and hetero-
geneity distribution f (·) rationalize the choice probabilities
{
q j (a)
}
.
Condition (i) is intuitive, and corresponds to preferences being non-satiated in the quantity of numeraire.
Indeed, if choice probabilities are generated by the structure
q j (a) =
∫
V
1
{
Wj (a j,η)≥ max
r∈{0,1,...J}\{ j}
Wr (ar,η)
}
f (η)dη ,
whereWj (,η) are strictly increasing and continuous, and their distributions sufficiently smooth, then con-
dition (i) must hold. Condition (iii) is related to the existence of a density function for unobserved hetero-
geneity. For models with parametrically specified heterogeneity distributions, condition (iii) was previously
used to recover underlying utility functions (c.f. McFadden, 1978, just above Eqn. 12). The motivation for
condition (ii) was discussed right before Theorem 1.
Proof. WLOG take m= 0, and use condition (ii) of the theorem to define
t j0 (a j,a0)≡
∂
∂a0
q j (a)/
∂
∂a j
q0 (a)≥ 0. (15)
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Now, because ∑Jj=0 q j (a) = 1, differentiating both sides w.r.t. a0 gives
∂
∂a0
q0 (a)+
J
∑
j=1
∂
∂a0
q j (a) = 0. (16)
Substituting (15) in (16), we get the linear, homogeneous, partial differential equation in q0 (·):
∂
∂a0
q0 (a)+
J
∑
j=1
∂
∂a j
q0 (a)× t j0 (a j,a0) = 0. (17)
This PDE can be solved via the method of characteristics (c.f. Courant, 1962, Chapter I.5 and II.2). The
characteristic curve, i.e. the J-dimensional subspace on which q0 (a) remains constant, can be obtained as
follows. Parametrize a j = a j (r) j = 0,1, ...J and consider
0=
dq0
dr
=
∂q0 (a)
∂a0
da0 (r)
dr
+
J
∑
j=1
∂q0 (a)
∂a j
×
da j (r)
dr
.
Comparing with (17), we get
da0 (r)
dr
= 1,
da j (r)
dr
= t j0 (a j,a0) , j = 1, ...J,
implying the characteristic ordinary differential equations:
da j
da0
= t j0 (a j,a0) , (18)
for j = 1, ...,J. Using Picard’s theorem and the principle of solving linear homogeneous PDEs (see Ap-
pendix), we obtain the general solutions of (18) given by ω j (a j,a0) = cons, where ω j (a j,a0) is differen-
tiable, strictly increasing in a0 and strictly decreasing in a j, and satisfies
∂ω j (a j,a0)
∂a0
+
∂ω j (a j,a0)
∂a j
t j0 (a j,a0) = 0, (19)
and also, using (15)
−
∂ω j (a j,a0)
∂a0
/
∂ω j (a j,a0)
∂a j
≡
∂
∂a0
q j (a)/
∂
∂a j
q0 (a) . (20)
A general solution q0 (a) is therefore of the form
q0 (a) =H0 (ω1 (a1,a0) ,ω2 (a2,a0) , ...,ωJ (aJ,a0)) , (21)
where H0 (·) can be chosen to be strictly increasing and C
1 in each argument, and with continuous Jth
order cross partial derivatives. In particular, any J dimensional continuously differentiable C.D.F. H0 (·)
would produce an admissible solution. Since q0 (a) is observed, the exact functional form of H0 (·) is pinned
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down by (21), for any set of solutions ω j (·, ·) to the ODEs (18). This corresponds to the so-called ”initial
condition” in the PDE nomenclature. In particular, given any a0, the value of H0 (x1,x2, ...xJ) at any vector
(x1,x2, ...xJ) is given by
H0 (x1,x2, ...xJ) = q0 (a0,b1 (x1,a0) , ...bJ (xJ,a0)) ,
where b j (x j,a0) is defined by
ω j (b j (x j,a0) ,a0) = x j (22)
In this construction, the choice of a0 is immaterial. That is, for two choices a0 6= a
′
0,
q0 (a0,b1 (x1,a0) , ...bJ (xJ,a0))
= H0 (ω1 (b1 (x1,a0) ,a0) ,ω2 (b2 (x2,a0) ,a0) , ...,ωJ (bJ (xJ,a0) ,a0))
= H0 (x1,x2, ...xJ)
= H0
(
ω1
(
b1
(
x1,a
′
0
)
,a′0
)
,ω2
(
b2
(
x2,a
′
0
)
,a′0
)
, ...,ωJ
(
bJ
(
xJ,a
′
0
)
,a′0
))
= q0
(
a′0,b1
(
x1,a
′
0
)
, ...bJ
(
xJ,a
′
0
))
.
Having obtained the ω j (·, ·)’s from (18) and (19), for each j = 1, ...J, define the function w j (a j,v) by
inversion, i.e.
w j (a j,v) =
{
a0 : ω j (a j,a0) = v
}
. (23)
Note that by construction, w j (a j,v) is strictly increasing and continuous in a j for each v. The w j (·.·)’s will
play the role of ‘utilities’ in our proof of integrability. Set w0 (a0,v0)≡ a0.
We now show how to construct the distribution of heterogeneity. Let V¯ j denote the co-domain of
ω j (·, ·), and let
V j = V¯ j ∩
{
ω j (a j,a0) :
J
∏
j=1
{
∂
∂a0
ω j (a j,a0)×
∂
∂a j
ω j (a j,a0)
}
6= 0
}
,
and let V ≡×Jj=1V j. Now, given any vector v≡ (v1, ...,vJ) ∈ V , define the cumulative distribution function
at v as
F (v1, ...,vJ) = q0 (a0,a1, ...,aJ) ,
where the vector (a0,a1, ...,aJ) satisfies v j = ω j (a j,a0), for each j = 1, ...J. It follows from (21) and (22)
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that this function is well-defined. The above CDF implies the density function f : V →R+:
f (v1, ...,vJ)
=
∂ J
∂a1...∂aJ
q0 (a0,a1, ...,aJ) |v j=ω j(a j ,a0), j=1,...J
∏
J
j=1
∂
∂a j
ω j (a j,a0) |v j=ω j(a j ,a0), j=1,...J
(24)
=
∂ J−1
∂a1...∂ak−1∂ak+1...∂aJ
∂
∂ak
q0 (a0,a1, ...,aJ) |v j=ω j(a j ,a0), j=1,...J
∏
J
j=1
∂
∂a j
ω j (a j,a0) |v j=ω j(a j ,a0), j=1,...J
, for any k ∈ {1, ...,J}
=
∂ J−1
∂a1...∂ak−1∂ak+1...∂aJ

−
∂
∂ak
ωk (ak,a0)
∂ωk(ak ,a0)
∂a0︸ ︷︷ ︸
does not depend on a1...ak−1,ak+1...aJ
× ∂∂a0 qk (a0,a1, ...,aJ)

 |v j=ω j(a j ,a0)
∏
J
j=1
∂
∂a j
ω j (a j,a0) |v j=ω j(a j ,a0), j=1,...J
, from (20)
= −
∂ J−1
∂a1...∂ak−1∂ak+1...∂aJ
∂
∂a0
qk (a0,a1, ...,aJ) |v j=ω j(a j ,a0), j=1,...J
∂
∂a0
ωk(ak,a0)
∂
∂ak
ωk(ak,a0)
×∏
J
j=1
∂
∂a j
ω j (a j,a0) |v j=ω j(a j ,a0), j=1,...J
= −
∂ J−1
∂a1...∂ak−1∂ak+1...∂aJ
∂
∂a0
qk (a0,a1, ...,aJ) |v j=ω j(a j ,a0), j=1,...J
∂
∂a0
ωk (ak,a0)×∏
J
j=1, j 6=k
∂
∂a j
ω j (a j,a0) |v j=ω j(a j ,a0), j=1,...J
. (25)
Since ∂
J
∂a0∂a1...∂ak−1∂ak+1∂aJ
qk (a0,a1, ...aJ) has sign (−1)
J
and ∂∂a j
ω j (a j,a0) < 0, and
∂
∂a0
ω j (a j,a0) > 0 on
V , each of the above expressions has numerator and denominator of the same sign, and is thus non-negative.
We verify below that this joint density integrates to 1.
We now show that the above construction of w j (·, ·) (c.f. (23)) and the joint density of heterogeneity
(24) and (25) will indeed produce the original choice probabilities. To see this for alternative 1, consider the
integral
∫
V
1
{
w1 (a1,v1)≥ max
k∈{0,2,...J}
wk (ak,vk)
}
f (v1,v2, ...,v1)dv1...dvJ
=
∫
V
1
[
v1 ≥ ω1 (a1,a0) ,∩k∈{2,...J}1{vk ≤ ωk (ak,w1 (a1,v1))}
]
f (v1,v2, ...,v1)dv1...dvJ
Consider the substitution (v1,v2, ...vJ)→ (x1,x2, ...xJ) given by v1 = ω1 (a1,x1) (so that x1 = w1 (a1,v1)),
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and for k = 2, ...,J, vk = ωk (xk,x1), which transforms the above integral to
∫ ∞
a0
∫ ∞
a2
...
∫ ∞
aJ

 f (ω1 (a1,x1) ,ω2 (x2,x1) ...,ωJ (xJ,x1))
×
∣∣∣∣∂ω1(a1,x1)∂x1 ×∏Jk=2 ∂ω j(x j ,x1)∂x j
∣∣∣∣

dxJ...dx2dx1
=
∫ ∞
a0
∫ ∞
a2
...
∫ ∞
aJ

 f (ω1 (a1,x1) ,ω2 (x2,x1) ...,ωJ (xJ ,x1))
×(−1)J−1× ∂ω1(a1,x1)∂x1 ×∏
J
k=2
∂ω j(x j ,x1)
∂x j

dxJ...dx2dx1
= (−1)J−1×
∫ ∞
a0
∫ ∞
a2
...
∫ ∞
aJ
{
−
∂ J
∂x1∂x2...∂xJ
q1 (x1,a1,x2, ...xJ)
}
dxJ ...dx2dx1, by (25)
= (−1)J×
∫ ∞
a0
∫ ∞
a2
...
∫ ∞
aJ
{
∂ J
∂x1∂x2...∂xJ
q1 (x1,a1,x2, ...xJ)
}
dxJ...dx2dx1
=
∫ a0
∞
∫ a2
∞
...
∫ aJ
∞
{
∂ J
∂x1∂x2...∂xJ
q1 (x1,a1,x2, ...xJ)
}
dxJ...dx2dx1
= q1 (a0,a1,a2, ...aJ) . (26)
Exactly analogous steps for j = 2, ...J, and using (25), lead to the conclusion that for all j ≥ 1,
∫
1
{
w j (a j,v j)≥ max
k∈{0,1,2,...J}\{ j}
wk (ak,vk)
}
f (v1,v2, ...,v1)dv1...dvJ
= q j (a0,a1,a2, ...aJ) .
Also, note that
∫
1
{
a0 ≥ max
k∈{1,2,...J}
wk (ak,vk)
}
f (v1,v2, ...,vJ)dv1...dvJ
=
∫ ω1(a1,a0)
0
...
∫ ωJ(aJ ,a0)
0
f (v1,v2, ...,vJ)dvJ ...dv1
substitute v j → x j satisfying v j = ω j (x j,a0)
=
∫ ∞
a1
∫ ∞
a2
...
∫ ∞
aJ
f (ω1 (x1,a0) , ...,ωJ (xJ,a0))
∣∣∣∣∂ω1 (x1,a0)∂x1 ...∂ωJ (xJ ,a0)∂xJ
∣∣∣∣dxJ ...dx1
=
∫ ∞
a1
∫ ∞
a2
...
∫ ∞
aJ
(−1)J× f (ω1 (x1,a0) , ...,ωJ (xJ,a0))
∂ω1 (x1,a0)
∂x1
...
∂ωJ (xJ ,a0)
∂xJ
dxJ...dx1
=
∫ a1
∞
...
∫ aJ
∞
∂ J
∂α1...∂αJ
q0 (a0,α1, ...αJ) |α1=x1,...α J=xJdxJ...dx1, by (24)
= q0 (a0,a1, ...aJ) .
Finally, to show that the joint density (24) integrates to 1, use exactly the same substitution as the one
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leading to (26), and observe that
∫
f (v1,v2, ...,vJ)dv1...dvJ
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞

 f (ω1 (a1,x1) ,ω2 (x2,x1) ...,ωJ (xJ ,x1))
×
∣∣∣∣∂ω1(a1,x1)∂x1 ×∏Jk=2 ∂ω j(x j ,x1)∂x j
∣∣∣∣

dx2...dxJdx1
= (−1)J×
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
{
∂ J
∂x1∂x2...∂xJ
q1 (x1,a1,x2, ...xJ)
}
dx2...dxJdx1
= q1 (−∞,a1,−∞, ...−∞)
= 1,
where q1 (−∞,a1,−∞, ...−∞) denotes the limit of the choice probability of alternative 1 when the a’s for
all other alternatives are tend to −∞.
Thus we have shown that a population endowed with our constructed w j (·,v j) as utilities, together with
the joint density of heterogeneity given by (24) would indeed produce the choice probabilities
{
q j (·, ...·)
}
for each j = 0,1, ...J.
Remark 2 The utility function for each alternative j, viz. w j (a j,v j), constructed in the proof of Theorem
1, consists of a scalar heterogeneity v j. However, the individual demand function for alternative j has J
separate sources of heterogeneity, i.e.
Q j (a,v) = 1
{
w j (a j,v j)≥ max
r∈{0,1,...J}\{ j}
wr (ar,vr)
}
= Q j

a0,a1, ...aJ , v1,v2, ...,vJ︸ ︷︷ ︸
J dimensional heterogeneity


Thus, we have rationalized a (J+1) dimensional choice probability function via a J-dimensional hetero-
geneity distribution.
4 Further Points
Identification: Theorem 1 can also be used to identify utilities and the heterogeneity distributions non-
parametrically from choice-probabilities observed in a dataset. Nonparametric identification of multinomial
choice models has been studied previously in the econometric literature (c.f. Matzkin, 1993). Since our
proof of rationalizability presented in Theorem 1 is constructive, it provides an alternative and novel way to
obtain identification by solving PDEs.
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Toward that end, suppose that the choice-probabilities are generated by maximization of the utilities
u j ≡
{
h j (a j)+ ε j
}
, j= 0, ...,J, where the h j (·) functions are strictly increasing and continuous, and hence
invertible. Observe that an observationally equivalent utility structure is where utility for the 0th alternative
is a0 and that for the jth alternative is h
−1
0

h j (a j)+ ε j− ε0︸ ︷︷ ︸
v j

 ≡ w j (a j,v j), in that these utilities will
produce exactly the same choice probabilities as the
{
u j
}
s. We work under this normalization from now on.
We also note in passing that the w j (a j,v j) are not necessarily additive in the unobserved heterogeneity v j.
Let a and q j (a) be as above. We can use the proof of Theorem 1 to identify the w j (a j,v j) functions and
the joint distribution of (v1, ...,vJ) from the
{
q j (a)
}
, as follows. First, note that
q0 (a) = Pr
(
∩ j 6=0
{
a0 > w j (a j,v j)
})
= Pr
[
∩ j 6=0
{
v j < ω j (a j,a0)
}]
,
so that
∂
∂a j
q0 (a) =
∂
∂a j
ω j (a j,a0)×Fj (ω1 (a1,a0) , ...,ωJ (aJ,a0)) , (27)
where Fj (·) denotes the derivative of the joint distribution function of v w.r.t. its jth element. On the other
hand,
q j (a) = Pr[w j (a j,v j)> a0,w j (a j,v j)> w1 (a1,v1) , ...w j (a j,v j)> wJ (aJ,vJ)
= Pr[v j > ω j (a j,a0) ,v1 < ω1 (a1,w j (a j,v j)) , ...vJ < ωJ (aJ,w j (a j,v j))
=
∫ ∞
ω j(a j ,a0)
∫ ω1(a1,w j(a j ,v j))
−∞
...
∫ ωJ(aJ ,w j(a j,v j))
−∞
f (v1, ...,vJ)dvJ...dv1dv j,
and therefore, by chain-rule, the first fundamental theorem of calculus, and using w j (a j,ω j (a j,a0)) = a0,
we have that
∂
∂a0
q j (a) = −
∂
∂a0
ω j (a j,a0)×
∫ ω1(a1,a0)
−∞
...
∫ ωJ(aJ ,a0)
−∞
f (v1, ...,vJ)dvJ...dv1
= −
∂
∂a0
ω j (a j,a0)×Fj (ω1 (a1,a0) , ...,ωJ (aJ,a0)) , (28)
and thus from (27) and (28), we have that
−
∂ω j (a j,a0)
∂a0
/
∂ω j (a j,a0)
∂a j
≡
∂
∂a0
q j (a)/
∂
∂a j
q0 (a) , (29)
which is the same as (20). The RHS of (29) is observable from the data, and under the hypothesis of the
model, is solely a function of a0 and a j, which is a testable implication. If this implication is not rejected,
denote the RHS of (29) as t j (a j,a0) (this t j (·, ·) can be estimated by, say a least squares projection of
∂
∂a0
q j (a)/
∂
∂a j
q0 (a) on a polynomial sieve in a j,a0). Then solve the PDE
∂ω j (a j,a0)
∂a0
+
∂ω j (a j,a0)
∂a j
t j0 (a j,a0) = 0,
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for the ω j (·, ·)’s as outlined above in (18), obtain the w j (a j,v j) by inverting the solution ω j (a j,a0)’s w.r.t.
a0, and the joint density of v using (24).
Incorporating Covariates: In our discussion above, choice probabilities q j (·) defined in Section 2,
correspond to so-called “structural” parameters in Econometrics. Estimating these from a non-experimental
dataset might be non-trivial when observed budget sets (i.e. price and/or income) are correlated with un-
observed individual preferences across the cross-section of consumers. A common empirical assumption is
that budget sets and preferences are independent, conditional on a set of observed covariates. Hence it is
useful to see how to adapt the above results to the presence of covariates.3
Suppose in addition to price and income, we also observe a vector of consumer characteristics, denoted
by s, and a vector of characteristics z j for each alternative j = 1, ...,J. Assume that the choice-probabilities
are generated by maximization of the utilities u0 ≡ {h0 (a0,s)+ ε0}, and u j ≡
{
h j (a j,z j,s)+ ε j
}
, j =
1, ...,J, where h0 (a,s) and each h j (a,z,s) are strictly increasing and continuous in a, and hence invertible.
Then an observationally equivalent utility structure is where utility for the 0th alternative is a0 and that
for the jth alternative is h−10

h j (a j,z j,s)+ ε j− ε0︸ ︷︷ ︸
v j
,s

 ≡ w j (a j,z j,v j,s), which is in general not linear or
separable in v j. Working off this normalization, and essentially repeating the same steps as above holding
z j,s fixed, lead to the conclusion that for each z j, s,
−
∂ω j (a j,a0,z j,s)
∂a0
/
∂ω j (a j,a0,z j,s)
∂a j
≡
∂
∂a0
q j (a,z,s)/
∂
∂a j
q0 (a,z,s) . (30)
The RHS of (30) is observable from the data, and for each fixed z j and s, is solely a function of a0, a j, which
is a testable implication. If this implication is not rejected, denote the RHS of (30) as t j (a j,a0,z j,s), just as
above. Then for each each fixed z j and s, solve the PDE
∂ω j (a j,a0,z j,s)
∂a0
+
∂ω j (a j,a0,z j,s)
∂a j
t j (a j,a0,z j,s) = 0,
to obtain the ω j (a j,a0,z j,s), invert w.r.t. a0 to obtain the utilities w j (a j,v j,z j,s) and the joint density of v
using the analog of (24), where we utilize the inverse of ω j (a j,a0,z j,s) w.r.t. a j, analogous to (22) above.
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5 Appendix
Two basic ideas from the theory of partial and ordinary differential equations are used to prove Theorem 1.
We will use the notation C1 to indicate a function that is once continuously differentiable.
First consider the linear homogeneous PDE
∂σ (x,y,z)
∂x
+g2 (x,y)
∂σ (x,y,z)
∂y
+g3 (x,z)
∂σ (x,y,z)
∂ z
= 0. (31)
Suppose g2 and g3 areC
1 and do not vanish simultaneously. Then a general solution to this equation is given
by
σ (x,y,z) = φ (h2 (x,y) ,h3 (x,z)) ,
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where φ (·) is any arbitrary C1 function, and h2 (x,y) = c2 and h3 (x,z) = c3 are general solutions to the
ordinary differential equations
dy
dx
= g2 (x,y) ,
dz
dx
= g3 (x,z) . (32)
(See e.g. Courant, 1962, Chapter I.5, II.2). In particular, φ (·, ·) can be chosen to be strictly increasing in
both arguments.
The ODE (32) are referred to as the ”characteristic equations” of the linear PDE (31), and existence of a
solution to the PDE (31) amounts to existence of a solution of the ODE (32). The following lemma restates
a global version of the Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem that establishes conditions for existence of a solution to a
first-order ODE.
Lemma 1 (Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem) Suppose that a function g : R×R →R is continuous, and on each
strip Sa = {(x,y) : |x| ≤ a, |y|< ∞}, g(x,y) is Lipschitz in y. Then the ordinary differential equation n
′ (x) =
g(x,n(x)), has a general solution n(·) : R →R with n(·) being C1. (See, for instance, Coddington, 1961,
Theorem 9 and corollary).
This result is proved by showing that under the assumptions of the lemma, the map n(·) :→
∫ x
x0
g(s,n(s))ds
for any arbitrary x0 is a contraction, thereby ensuring, via the Banach fixed point theorem, the existence of
n(·) satisfying
n(x) = n(x0)+
∫ x
x0
g(s,n(s))ds.
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